Madisons thesis in federalist 10
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
In essence this: a group of decision-makers sufficiently detached from the immediate interests of a given controversy that they would serve more or less as a jury to judge the relative merits of the arguments and proposals advanced by the interested and contending parties.
After the Constitution was drafted during the Constitutional Convention in midyou actually have a significant group of people who are against the ratification.
Madison on democracy
The members of the independent force would necessarily change from issue to issue as different interests become embroiled in controversy. He flatly rejects creating a will in the community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The basic reason, as we see it, is to be found in the relative affluence of the American society. In these terms the contrasts between the small and large republic are striking: in the small republic where the interests are fewer and the ties between individuals are such that most individuals are forced to take sides one way or the other, the possibilities of an independent and decisive force in the decision-making councils are considerably reduced. To this we might also add that organization for unified action would probably have to take on conspiratorial overtones because secrecy might well be required in plotting action contrary to the common morality. Here referring to p. Calhoun, one of the first major critics of the extensive republic theory, lays out a scenario very similar to this in his A Disquisition on Government, in Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. If, as he conceded, the population of the nation would grow and if, as he also conceded, there must be an upward limit to the size of the representative assembly, the bonds of communion could not help but be severely weakened, if not entirely broken.
Or, it could be that a policy when viewed in the context of the whole may be seen as counterproductive. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.
Such a position regarding representation is easily reconciled with republicanism by assuming that, if the constituents possessed the same knowledge as their representatives, they, too, would see matters in the same light as their representatives and abandon their temporary or partial interests.
Certainly, in back of, or overarching their democratic caucusing, as Roche would have it, there must have been a prior and fairly wide consensus as to the feasibility of their undertaking. Consequently, a form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.
Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property.
To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. Indeed, Madison as much as invites us to look at the matter this way when he laments the character of the decision-making process that has led to the undoing of republics: No man is allowed to be a judge of his own cause because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity. Thus a policy that may have only a marginal benefit for a given geographical section of the country may have factious effects for another and eventually the whole nation. His avowed strategic purpose in Federalist 10 is to convince the reader that in the extended republic the effects of majority faction can be controlled without violence to these republican principles. Dierkes, Dr. Where, as in the case of competing religious sects, a partial end is sought to the detriment of other sects, the fragmentation of interests will preclude any action. Madison begins No. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. To this point in time, most of the interests have benefited. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. Given this, how are we to tell whether factious majorities have been able in practice to overcome the hurdles of extensiveness? Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good to temporary condition, but the opposite might happen.
Personally, I agree with the foundation of his arguments, especially on the topic of forms of government, as well as the role of representation in our government. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests.
Why are we to assume majorities will almost always act in a manner consistent with the public good? Let us detail some of these: a Multiplicity and diversity of interests certainly reduce the possibilities of a widespread union of interest with common motives.
based on 55 review